When Soft Power is too Meager

When Soft Power is too Meager

Gallia Lindenstrauss and Dara Frank*

From the recent resurge in the deadly attacks of the PKK to the devastating consequences of the earthquakes in South-Eastern Turkey, it seems as if Turkey has entered into a difficult period. This comes at a time when Turkish foreign policy itself is reshaping to adjust to the developments of the Arab Spring. Specifically regarding North Africa, Turkey is now embracing the revolutions and people of the three states that went through profound change: Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Turkey is mainly employing soft power toward these countries, a tactic that has served it well in the past but also has limits.

When Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyep Erdogan conducted his rock star-like tour through Egypt, Libya and Tunisia he was welcomed as a hero; comparisons between him and Nasser were voiced, alluding to his perceived ability to unite the Muslim world. However, rather than marking greater Turkish regional influence, this tour actually represents the height of its power. As the dust settles from Erdogan’s tour, the limitations of Turkey’s soft power are becoming evident.

At first glance, Turkish-style democracy appears to be the right model of government for the Arab Spring countries. Erdogan’s AK Party is a democratically elected Islamic-oriented party leading an economically prosperous nation. In fact, official statements issued by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt before Mubarak’s disposal proclaimed their desire to form a political party similar to the AKP. However, now Egyptian Islamists are increasingly reluctant to accept this Turkish model because of its secular dimensions. When Erdogan suggested that Egypt adopt a secular constitution, the Muslim Brotherhood’s sponsored Freedom and Justice Party announced that they did not need a lesson in democracy from Turkey. The prevailing opinion of those currently in power in the Freedom and Justice Party is that the new government should be a democratically-elected government based on the tenants of Shaira law.

Things are also unclear regarding Libya and Tunisia. While reconstruction in Libya may entail in it economic opportunities for Turkish firms, previous enterprises in this country were through contracts with the Gadhafi regime, so for better or for worse Turkey is beginning with a clean slate. The success of the moderate Islamist party in Tunisia, Ennahda, to win most of the votes in the recent elections may be a positive development in the eyes of AKP. However, Ennahda needs to form a coalition government to rule, something the AKP is less familiar with as it always ruled as a single party. Moreover, Turkey might soon realize that the nuances between apparent ideological parallels may cause greater problems than relations you have with an ideological opposite you know you can't convince. Tunisia's ability to go through a peaceful revolution may be proof that in fact it doesn't need strong outside guidance and that Tunisia wants to forge its own path.

Beyond the bilateral relations with these three states, Turkey's wish to play a dominant role as a regional diplomatic mediator has been sidelined. Surprisingly, Egypt’s transitional military government has proven quite effective in diplomatic negotiations. The Egyptian government brokered discussions between Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas chief Khaled Meshal with the hopes of creating a Fatah-Hamas unity government. Egypt also played the major role in finalizing the deal between Hamas and the Israeli government regarding the prisoner exchange deal between Shalit and Palestinian prisoners.

By its nature, the use of soft power alone doesn't generate immediate or direct effects. So while it is problematic to claim that Turkey's policy in North Africa will yield no results, there are definite limitations. In the long run, Egypt will probably shun Turkish aspirations to influence its internal developments. Moreover, even in its current weakness, Egypt is not willing to forgo its major role in the region. At the same time, Turkey is trying to repel the impression that its policies signal the return of the Ottoman Empire in a new form. Turkey must therefore forge the delicate path between trying to influence the Arab Spring countries and trying not to appear paternalistic. This is a gentle balance that states usually fail to achieve.

*Gallia Lindenstrauss is an associate researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS); Dara Frank is an intern at the INSS.