Why a One-State Solution is simply not an Option

When discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the terms “one-state”, “two-state” and sometimes even “three-state” solution are tossed around. These options refer to the “state” in a conventional manner: an organization with the monopoly over the use of violence within a given, clearly defined and defended territory.[1] Thus, a one-state solution has typically been defined as one sovereign nation state (either democratic or not) and two states have been defined as two clearly demarcated territories for two-peoples.

A few days ago, I attended a conference in East Jerusalem called The Best Plans for a Peaceful Israel/Palestine which presented a series of new and unconventional plans for a peaceful settlement.[2] While I think the premise of the conference—that we have not been able to solve the conflict with conventional models of the state so let’s expand our definition of what the state is— was really interesting, practically, I don’t believe any of these models will come to fruition. Many of the models proposed were based on the idea of a one-state solution in form but not in content. This new state does not look like a state in the conventional sense, it is a federation or something ‘post-state’ like a confederation of states like the EU or the US.

In this post I am going to explain why, no matter whether you call it a “state” or a “federation” or “condominium government” or “Union” or “The United States of Israel-Palestine” or a “Post-Nationalist, Humanist state”, a one-state solution is both undesirable and unattainable.

One State as a sovereign democratic nation-state

The traditional argument for one-state is pretty simple—it is one state for two-peoples. There are two potential outcomes of this kind of state: 1) We have a democracy with free and fair elections and Israel therefore loses its Jewish-ness; or 2) We have a Jewish state where Arabs are treated as second-class citizens and don’t have the right to vote and therefore it loses its democratic-ness. Neither of these are feasible options. On one hand, Israel is a Jewish state created to provide sanctuary for the Jewish people and on the other hand, it is a democracy based on concepts of equality and the protection of fundamental rights. Israel cannot afford to sacrifice either facet of its identity.

One State as a post-state federation

These arguments are slightly more nuanced and the details of the different plans take different forms, however the gist is something like this: There will be one state, spanning from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River with Jerusalem as the shared capital. It will be one country with two provinces and two identities where each province contributes equally to the federal parliament (regardless of population size). There will be free movement all over the country with no boundaries or checkpoints and Jews can live in the Palestinian territories and Palestinians can live in Israel. There will be a unified defense force but each province is permitted to keep its own national guard.

Some of the titles of these proposals are: The United Federation of Israel-Palestine, The Levantine Union, Parity for Peace, The United States of Israel-Palestine, The Post-Nationalists-Humanist State in Israel-Palestine, One Democratic Secular-State, Israeli-Palestinian Confederation and the 3-4-2 in 1 Federation of Israel-Palestine.[3]

There are a few ways to look at this concept of a federal Israel-Palestine: 1) it is a beautiful idea but it can never happen; or 2) It’s a terrible idea because most Israelis and Palestinians don’t want it to happen. Therefore, it’s either a great idea but impossible, or a terrible idea and therefore still impossible.

Why it is unattainable

This definition of a “nation-state” encompasses two important variables: the monopoly over violence and defined territory. Political Scientists and Political Historians describe the development of the nation-state as a slow evolutionary process that came about through the interplay of violence and the economy.[4] The interplay between security and profitable property begins with coercive action and through these rent-seeking payoffs the state achieves short-run stability. Ultimately throughout history, “the requirements of military technology led to alterations in control of the state as rulers were forced to exchange property rights and political concessions in order to achieve a viable military order in the face of ubiquitous competition among states.”[5]

This long evolutionary process was indigenous to Europe, and by the 19^th century, the nation-state was formed. However, we see in modern history, where the state model has been unilaterally imposed, like in African states and Middle Eastern states, it has resulted in extreme political and economic inefficiency.[6] The gist of the argument is: the state structure in Africa, as it appears today exists initially because of colonialism but ultimately because the elites of Africa chose to keep the structure. While elites inherited the state structure, they did not inherit the real power that comes with it. This resulted in very weakly centralized regimes that today exert power through concentric circles of authority.[7] The states do not have the ability to exercise discretion with force or use the threat of force and thus they neither have the monopoly over violence nor legitimacy to rule. This is slightly more nuanced in Middle Eastern countries because while nations lack legitimacy, they have the monopoly over force (like Syria). As an aside, this is why I personally believe that the UN unilaterally giving the Palestinian territories state status is a mistake.

I’m trying to articulate the fact that a post-state country (like a federation) is the next step on the evolutionary timeline but it cannot come before statehood. This is why Europe is (somewhat) capable of having a union of states, because they already had generations of nationalism and individual state-building activities. You can’t skip from non-state to post-state, you can’t unilaterally impose something that is not indigenous or created locally—it will not work.

Why it is undesirable

To put it bluntly, it is undesirable because people are both racist and nationalistic. Even in Europe where there is a successful model of a union people have racist and nationalistic ideas. For example, there is a reason that Turkey has not been admitted into the EU (and it has nothing to do with their government).

Many of the lecturers at the conference suggested that Israel and Palestine would live side-by-side in a greater federation like New York and New Jersey in the United States. However, there are few fundamental flaws with this comparison: 1) People in New York don’t hate people from New Jersey (all rhetoric about driving aside); 2) There is no real difference between the people of New York and the people of New Jersey that would contribute to them not wanting to live with each other—ethnic groups span borders and it makes no difference to a New Yorker if a New Jerseyian moves next door to him or vice versa; 3) There are still clearly defined borders.

Addressing these concerns individually:

1. While we cannot dwell on emotion when coming to a political solution, feelings need to be taken into account. I cannot imagine that the vast majority of either Israeli or Palestinian society will just decide one day that they don’t hate Muslims, or they don’t want to blow up Jews. Or that they don’t hold a grudge for the fact that their son was killed in a terrorist attack or that they were evicted from their homes. There is too much hate in this country right now, too much ignorance on both sides for us to live in harmony and denying this fact ignores the complexity of the issue. Peace does not mean harmony and it has been difficult to come to a peaceful solution as it is, imagine how difficult a harmonious solution would be.

2. I believe that a federation would be a slow process that would eliminate the Jewish-ness of Israel and minimize Palestinian nationalism. Why do the vast majority of people make Aliyah? To live in a country with other Jews. Maybe they are religious and want to live in a place where there is a plethora of kosher restaurants, where they don’t have worry if their milk or bread is Kosher and where there will always be a Minyan. Or maybe they are secular but want to live among people who understand what a Passover Seder is, or they don’t want to be persecuted or made fun of for their beliefs and/or heritage.

3. Put simply, borders—even city/state borders—prevent against collective action problems.

The underlying issue

This might be slightly more controversial but I believe that the underlying issue is one of national identity.

I think the most offensive argument made against Palestinian statehood is: There is no such thing as Palestinian identity, the Palestinians never existed as a people, they don’t deserve a state, there’s no such thing as a Palestinian blah blah blah… No, that is not true. National identity is very easily created, you don’t need hundreds of year to forge a national identity—what was an Israeli before 1948? The Palestinians deserve a state just as much as the Israelis do. However, I think the underlying issue is the manifestation of this Palestinian identity and desire to build a strong Palestinian state. All of the one-state federation plans involved using the already cultivated and built land of Israel. Rather than focusing on what Palestinians can gain by joining a larger nation with Israel, they should be focused on the institutions necessary to build their own state—building roads and schools, establishing an efficient system of government. I’m not saying that a process of the sort has not begun, nor am I saying that it has always been easy for the Palestinians to do so, however, I am saying that it is necessary.

Where do we go from here?

I agree strongly with Gershon Baskin who introduced the conference by saying that “the only solution is a two-state solution.” But these two states have to be strong states with a strong sense of practical nationalism. Zionism and the strong desire to leave ones home and build a land for the Jewish people made Israel what it is today. A similar sentiment needs to be cultivated in the Palestinian population. To take this one step further, these state-building activities should also be promoting a democratic state; activities that promote civil society development.

Maybe we as a generation are too obsessed with the state model and maybe a nation-state in the long-run is not the best solution. However, until individuals are capable of a “post-state” mentality, a two-state solution is the only option for Israelis and Palestinians.

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[1] More or less what Weber says

[2] The conference was hosted by IPCRI, the Free Muslim Coalition and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. These ideas were presented on Monday November 28, 2011 at Ambassador Hotel in Sheik Jarrah.

[3] For more information about these plans visit the website: http://www.thebestplans.org/

[4] The books I’m referring to specifically are: Coercion, Capital and European States by Charles Tilly, and Structure and Change in Economic History by Douglass C. North.

[5] North, 208

[6] If you’re interested in the specifics and details of this argument, refer to: States and Power in Africa by Jeffery Herbst.

[7] Political elites’ power often dissipates as you get further away from where they reside in urban areas.

Turkish-Israeli Reconciliation: Can Egypt Facilitate?

First published in Hurriyet Daily News on November 28, 2011: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkish-israeli-reconciliation-can-egypt-facilitate-2011-11-28

By Gallia Lindenstrauss and Dara Frank

Since the leaking of the Palmer Report and the ensuing reactions of Turkey and Israel, there seems to be little room for hope regarding Turkish-Israeli relations. Still, it is in both Turkey’s and Israel’s long-term strategic interest to re-create a semblance of positive relations. While attempts for bilateral reconciliation between Israel and Turkey continue, it seems that in order to reach a compromise, Turkey and Israel might also need the help of a third party. The U.S. has tried to mediate between the sides to no avail. European countries might prove to be problematic mediators because of the tensions resulting from the stall in the process of Turkey’s accession to the EU. Others might wish to mediate, but it may actually be Egypt who will prove to be the most suitable third party to assist the sides in reaching a successful agreement.

Egypt has always enjoyed regional clout. Since the disposal of Mubarak, even though a transitional government is in power, it has surprisingly played a significant role regarding the Palestinian issue. Egypt presided over the signing of a unity deal between Hamas and Fatah and continues to assist in fostering this unity. Egypt also helped bring to closing the Shalit prisoner exchange between Israel and Hamas by encouraging both Israel and Hamas to make concessions they had previously rejected. Egyptian intelligence officials were also in the process of arranging a ceasefire between the Gaza-based Islamic Jihad group and Israel in the recent flare-up in violence.

While Egypt would in no case want to be seen as Israel’s advocate, it is also in Egypt’s geo-political interest to mediate reconciliation between Turkey and Israel. It would give Egypt another opportunity to demonstrate its influence in the region. By brokering an agreement, Egypt will also strengthen its relationship with the U.S., as there is a keen American interest that Turkey and Israel reconcile their differences. Another compelling reason for Egypt to broker negotiations would be to mask the challenges of democratic progress and its domestic difficulties by presenting an impression of governmental efficiency in the foreign affairs of the country.

Turkey has presented Israel with three conditions that must be met for full diplomatic relations to be restored: A formal apology must be issued, compensations must be given to the victims’ families and those injured and Israel must remove the blockade on Gaza. Of the three conditions, it appears that a formula to solve the compensation issue has basically been reached in previous negotiations and would involve Israel transferring money to a fund designated for this purpose. The other two conditions have proved to be much more problematic. Many within the Israeli political system and – according to polls – most of the Israeli public, highly object to the idea of a formal apology being issued. Also, during the time of the Palmer Report, another big challenge in reaching a settlement was Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s objection to issuing an apology. However, if he were to change his mind in the future, there is enough support in the defense ministry and in some Israeli opinion leaders to enable him to issue such an apology.

The third condition Turkey stipulated, the removal of the blockade over Gaza, instilled many Israelis with the impression that Turkey was not actually interested in improving relations with Israel. However, as the blockade has already been eased and because Egypt has declared it will now keep the Rafah crossing open, the situation is different from when Israel first implemented the blockade in 2007. Israel will have to make more concessions on the matter, but Egypt might deduce the formula that will leave less room for Turkey to use this matter as a reason not to restore relations with Israel.

Will both sides agree to Egyptian mediation? The Israeli government has already expressed its desire to maintain working relations with Egypt and has also demonstrated its trust in Egyptian mediation efforts. On the other hand, Turkey has stated in the past that Israel and Turkey do not need mediation as Turkey has clearly presented the conditions that should be met. Moreover, it is Turkey that sees itself as the leading regional mediator. Still, if a deal will be struck in a way that it will be presented within the larger agenda of Turkey embracing the new Egypt, maybe there will be more openness on the Turkish side to accept Egyptian efforts.

*Gallia Lindenstrauss is an associate researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv University, Israel; Dara Frank is an intern at the INSS.

Creating the rules of Egyptian democracy

This article first appeared in the Jerusalem Post on November 28, 2011: http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.aspx?id=247229

The violent clashes in Cairo beginning this past weekend beg the questions: Will the current elections create the best type of democracy possible? What is the best type of democracy for Egypt? Since the rules of the game shape the end result of the game, the constitution and electoral rules need to be written in order to create and protect the rule of law.

Democracy – a system of voting that promotes majority rule – alone is not sufficient. Egypt needs some form of liberal democracy – free and fair elections and protections for minority rights, and safeguards for certain fundamental freedoms. But how can this be achieved in Egypt? In theory, it should be very easy.

However, the violence leading up to the election shows that problems arise when political constraints are taken into consideration.

In the choice between parliamentary democracy and presidential democracy, a parliamentary system looks as if it would most accommodate both liberalism and efficiency within an Egyptian context. Psychologically, a parliamentary system might appear more trustworthy to the Egyptian people due to the fact that they were under the rule of an authoritarian president for 30 years.

This system would also be more likely to ensure efficient and fair democratic results for the specific demography of Egypt. A presidential system often entails slow democracy, whereas a parliamentary system would be more likely to allow Egypt to make the necessary changes to advance the country both politically and economically.

To ensure these results, the electoral system should be one of moderate proportional representation. This would create a few catch-all parties capable of working together to form coalitions by having the population vote for half the members of parliament from a party list and the other half from a pool of individuals.

That way, neither the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) nor the Islamist parties could hold all of the power without sharing it.

To accommodate diversity, a bicameral legislature would allow for regional representation. The people of Egypt have a wide spectrum of concerns (individuals living in Cairo and the Sinai might not have the same priorities). This would also assist minority groups, such as Coptic Christians who make up 10 percent of the population. A federal and decentralized government should be created that would include a medium- to-high election threshold, around 5%, that would not exclude the Coptic population but that would exclude radical groups.

In order to ensure greater efficiency, the bicameral legislature should also have power shared between the executive and the legislative branches. This way, Egypt would have created a liberal democracy where there are enough checks and balances to ensure one group does not have the monopoly of power but also allows enough fluidity in the government to institute quick and necessary changes.

However, government does not exist within a vacuum. The leaders in Egypt know that the rules of the constitution and the electoral process will dictate who will retain power and therefore there is much incentive to manipulate the outline of a constitution.

This is why the SCAF wants the constitution to be written now, the Islamists want the constitution to be written after they are (probably) voted into power and the youth movements wants the process to be stalled until they can better organize. This is why the protests began on Friday: The Islamists saw that an electoral system run by SCAF will result in SCAF leadership.

As of right now, the electoral rules are conducive for the ruling party to retain power. Two-thirds of the seats are supposed to be decided by lists; one-third will be given to individual winners and some seats will be appointed. The biggest problem is that voting will not be held on one day – the multi-tiered electoral process means that groups counting the votes can round them up or down to whatever percent they want.

Even a perfect constitution cannot create a perfect liberal democracy, and it will take leadership and personal determination for democracy to hold. The miracle of the American constitution was not the system of government written down but rather the fact that George Washington stepped down from power after two terms. We can only hope that whatever system of government Egypt decides on is actually implemented.

The writer is a research intern at the Institute for National Security Studies.

Is Judaism a Zero-Sum Game?

In this week’s Parsha[1], Toldot, we hear the story of Jacob and Esau. Isaac marries Rebecca and they are incapable of having children for ten years. Isaac prays to G-d for her to conceive but once she does, her pregnancy is incredibly painful. She prays to G-d to tell her what’s going on. G-d responds: “’Two nations are in your womb, and two kingdoms will separate from your innards, and one kingdom will become mightier than the other kingdom…’” (Gen.25:23).

It thus appears that the story of Jacob and Esau seeks to introduce a larger political discussion; one that shows politics (and Judaism) as a zero-sum game. Only one of these two children (or nations) can be strong and they get their strength at the expense of the other (which we see when Jacob steals his brother’s birthright). In his commentary, Rashi cites Ezek. 26:2: “’I shall become full from the destroyed city.’” Tyre became full [gained power] only from the destruction of Jerusalem. — [From Meg. 6a, Pes. 42b].” This theme is also discussed in Echa (lamentations read on Tisha B’av[2]) where it says, “For these things I weep; my eyes flow with tears; for a comforter is far from me, one to revive my spirit; my children are desolate, for the enemy has prevailed” (1:16). In both situations, the Jewish people fail and despair at the expense of the success of another nation.

This is an apparent theme throughout Jewish history and the opposite is true as well (although there are fewer examples of this); Jews only conquer and win at the expense of the other power (think of the Chanukah story where the Judaism conquers Hellenism—at least in Jerusalem).

We know that since Judaism is still around today that Judaism was never actually conquered but to what extent has Judaism continued at the expense of these other nations? Historically speaking, Judaism has actually adopted aspects of the different cultures that conquered it and who it conquered. One example: A Rabbi was telling me the other day that those black lines you see on a tallit[3] were actually adopted from the Roman tradition where Senators wore purple lines on their robes. During that time, tallit looked like different than they do today; they looked almost like the garments Roman senators would wear so Jews started putting blue lines on their tallit (which then became black after the Romans banned the dye to make the blue stripes).

While it may be easy to see how physical traditions took hold a slightly harder questions to answer are: to what extent does Jewish theology evolve? And to what extent is that evolution influenced by surrounding cultures and idea? To take this one step further: As a Jew, how do you reconcile between Torah and philosophy?

Jewish theology is not Greek philosophy and it is not modern Liberalism. To study Torah properly, you can’t read it as a Liberal or as a person who truly believes in Western philosophy. This hard for me personally because I was brought up learning about Western Philosophy and applying Judaism to the secular ideas I learned. This, I believe, is the wrong approach but I have not successfully changed my lenses—I still view Judaism as a Liberal (Lockean Liberal who believes every person deserves fundamental rights of life, liberty and property and everything that comes with it).

To elaborate further, I think a short explanation on the (basic and simplified) premise of Judaism is necessary: man is imperfect and he is incapable of reaching perfection through human means (as opposed to the Greek philosophers who believe that the highest state of existence is reached through logos). Therefore, G-d, who is perfect, gives man a set of laws (Mitzvot) to follow so that he can be a better person, work to fix the world, and be holy (the intricacies of this premise can be addressed at another time).

Liberalism and all other reason based philosophies therefore seem incompatible with Judaism. However, it is hard for me to believe that entirely.

There’s a Midrash about Rabbi Akiva and Moses that speaks to this issue. It goes something like this: Moses is talking to G-d on Sinai and asks G-d why He is putting drawing taggim (the crowns over some of the letters in the scroll), G-d answers that it is because generations later, a man named Rabbi Akiva will find significance in interpreting them. Moses wants to meet this Rabbi Akiva and is transferred to his classroom in the first century CE. Moses sits at the back of the classroom and proceeds to listen to a lesson about a particular law that Moses had never heard of before. When a student asks Rabbi Akiva where this law came from, he replied that it came from Moses.

What this Midrash appears to be saying is that Torah has grown and evolved. And since discussion and debate about Torah cannot exist in a vacuum, great Jewish scholars must have been influenced by philosophers and thinkers of their time and little bits of philosophy must have trickled into Jewish theology. One example can be seen in the works of Maimonides who takes Aristotle’s principle of the mean and attributes Jewish teachings to it.

There is some teaching (and I’ll find the source as soon as possible) that says something like: the further we get from Sinai, the closer we get to the Messiah. I guess that’s obvious if you view this as a timeline (depending on your belief obviously) but I think the idea is slightly more powerful. Yes, as time goes on, we slowly loose principles from Sinai as they were given at Sinai, however, the more we are capable of using our reason to allow Torah to evolve, the closer we get to the Mashiach[4] (and peace).

This is a huge struggle, how do you balance between complete submission to the law (i.e. I have no ability to use my own logos) and complete rejection of the law (my logos is more important than the law)? The real answer exists somewhere in the middle which means that Judaism cannot be a zero-sum game.

Mashiach (and again dear readers, interpret this as esoterically as you’d like) will not come as soon as Jews follow the letter of the law entirely. One of the explanations given for the destruction of the Temple was that Jews lost the spirit of the law to the letter of the law. Ultimately, Mashiach will arrive because Jews will be able to balance submission to Jewish law with reason. Until women are not forced to walk on the other side of the street during religious holidays or not forced to sit in the back of the bus when traveling to certain places because they will recognized as equals; and until it is accepted that parts of the West Bank have to be given away to create a sovereign Palestinian state and that peace should be more important than fulfilling the Mitzvah of “settling the land,” there will be no peace and there will be no Mashiach.

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[1] The part of the Torah we read this week

[2] the 9^th of the Jewish month of Av is a day of morning as Jews remember the destructions of both Temples (by the Babylonians in 586BCE and the Romans in 70CE) and a lot of other bad stuff.

[3] Jewish prayer shawls

[4] The messiah

When Soft Power is too Meager

When Soft Power is too Meager

Gallia Lindenstrauss and Dara Frank*

From the recent resurge in the deadly attacks of the PKK to the devastating consequences of the earthquakes in South-Eastern Turkey, it seems as if Turkey has entered into a difficult period. This comes at a time when Turkish foreign policy itself is reshaping to adjust to the developments of the Arab Spring. Specifically regarding North Africa, Turkey is now embracing the revolutions and people of the three states that went through profound change: Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Turkey is mainly employing soft power toward these countries, a tactic that has served it well in the past but also has limits.

When Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyep Erdogan conducted his rock star-like tour through Egypt, Libya and Tunisia he was welcomed as a hero; comparisons between him and Nasser were voiced, alluding to his perceived ability to unite the Muslim world. However, rather than marking greater Turkish regional influence, this tour actually represents the height of its power. As the dust settles from Erdogan’s tour, the limitations of Turkey’s soft power are becoming evident.

At first glance, Turkish-style democracy appears to be the right model of government for the Arab Spring countries. Erdogan’s AK Party is a democratically elected Islamic-oriented party leading an economically prosperous nation. In fact, official statements issued by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt before Mubarak’s disposal proclaimed their desire to form a political party similar to the AKP. However, now Egyptian Islamists are increasingly reluctant to accept this Turkish model because of its secular dimensions. When Erdogan suggested that Egypt adopt a secular constitution, the Muslim Brotherhood’s sponsored Freedom and Justice Party announced that they did not need a lesson in democracy from Turkey. The prevailing opinion of those currently in power in the Freedom and Justice Party is that the new government should be a democratically-elected government based on the tenants of Shaira law.

Things are also unclear regarding Libya and Tunisia. While reconstruction in Libya may entail in it economic opportunities for Turkish firms, previous enterprises in this country were through contracts with the Gadhafi regime, so for better or for worse Turkey is beginning with a clean slate. The success of the moderate Islamist party in Tunisia, Ennahda, to win most of the votes in the recent elections may be a positive development in the eyes of AKP. However, Ennahda needs to form a coalition government to rule, something the AKP is less familiar with as it always ruled as a single party. Moreover, Turkey might soon realize that the nuances between apparent ideological parallels may cause greater problems than relations you have with an ideological opposite you know you can't convince. Tunisia's ability to go through a peaceful revolution may be proof that in fact it doesn't need strong outside guidance and that Tunisia wants to forge its own path.

Beyond the bilateral relations with these three states, Turkey's wish to play a dominant role as a regional diplomatic mediator has been sidelined. Surprisingly, Egypt’s transitional military government has proven quite effective in diplomatic negotiations. The Egyptian government brokered discussions between Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas chief Khaled Meshal with the hopes of creating a Fatah-Hamas unity government. Egypt also played the major role in finalizing the deal between Hamas and the Israeli government regarding the prisoner exchange deal between Shalit and Palestinian prisoners.

By its nature, the use of soft power alone doesn't generate immediate or direct effects. So while it is problematic to claim that Turkey's policy in North Africa will yield no results, there are definite limitations. In the long run, Egypt will probably shun Turkish aspirations to influence its internal developments. Moreover, even in its current weakness, Egypt is not willing to forgo its major role in the region. At the same time, Turkey is trying to repel the impression that its policies signal the return of the Ottoman Empire in a new form. Turkey must therefore forge the delicate path between trying to influence the Arab Spring countries and trying not to appear paternalistic. This is a gentle balance that states usually fail to achieve.

*Gallia Lindenstrauss is an associate researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS); Dara Frank is an intern at the INSS.

Machiavellian politics and humanism

Last week I attended a conference at the INSS called “The UN recognition of a Palestinian State and the New Middle East—Challenges for EU foreign Policy.” The conference was very well attended and included keynote speakers such as members of the Knesset, members of the European Parliament and members of PLO and Fatah. The conference was, to say the very least, eye-opening. The topic was supposed to be the EU’s foreign policy however, this was quickly sidelined and the discussion focused on negotiations and Palestinian statehood in general.

It became obvious rather quickly, that not only can Israelis and the Palestinians not agree on the terms of negotiation, they can’t even agree on the terms of the terms of negotiation. I left the conference feeling defeated and depressed but after some reflection, I realized that I did not actually learn anything new about international politics; the conference only served to put theory into reality for me. I also came to a personal conclusion that the beliefs I have; being pro-Israel as the land for the Jewish people and pro-peace/pro-establishment of a Palestinian state, are not contradictory beliefs. In the end, this conference only strengthened my convictions to help find a solution but made the path towards that solution both clearer and more difficult to navigate.

First I realized that Machiavelli was right all along. In chapter 15 of the Prince, Machiavelli articulates a new “effectual truth” that politics is a constant series of power struggles. This new truth brought a radically new definition of politics forward by articulating that the purpose of politics is not what the ancient political philosophers said it was (to be good or teach goodness) but rather to survive and maintain power by surviving and maintaining power through whatever means necessary. He states that all social and political interaction are fundamentally rooted in mankind’s psychological and material needs that result in a drive for power. In a more modern approach—all politics are politics of self interest and it is the primary goal of each state not to act on idealist convictions but to preserve their self-interest (which is most fundamentally security). This was reiterated constantly at the conference: the leader of the Opposition in the Knesset, MK Tzipi Livni articulated quite clearly that it is in Israel’s best interest to negotiate now (because the status-quo is not sustainable for Israel) not out of respect for the Palestinians. Palestinian Chief Negotiator Dr. Sa’eb Erekat said the same thing—he did not wake up one morning feeling sympathetic to the Israeli cause, it is in his people’s best interest to negotiate now.

If it is in both sides’ best interest to negotiate, what is stalling negotiations? (the million dollar question—right?). Well, it goes back to Machiavelli again—it may be in both sides’ best interest to come to a solution, but neither side is willing to give up what it sees as fundamental in order to maintain its state’s interest—in Israel’s case the fundamental security question and in the Palestinian’s case recognizing Israel as a state for the Jewish people. Both Israel and the Palestinians see the need to rely on their own arms and thus it is reasonable that both sides see it from their perspective and none-other—when each side sees the terms from one perspective, the fundamental language of negotiation is difficult to define. The most depressing realization I came to after the conference was that bilateral negotiations are going to be very difficult.

If we were in Machiavelli’s time, there would be no discussion—Israel would have just claimed the territory through conquest and there would be no more argument. But fortunately, our society has advanced—we have entered into a world where a stark realist, Thucydidean mentality (“the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”) is not the only way forward. We live in a world of Liberals—Lockean Liberals—who believe that certain unalienable rights exist for all mankind. I am one of those Liberals who believes that every person should be entitled to their rights of “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” However, it is also important not to forget what Machiavelli said. That is why negotiations have to reflect the current reality. Both sides have to negotiate but that does not mean meeting half-way; if it were as easy as percentages, Israel should have to give up 30-40% while the Palestinians should have to give up 60-70% (I don’t mean in land, I mean in items on the negotiation table). Some would claim that’s not fair however it is “fair” based on all conventions of foreign negotiation and international norms of power.

I guess that makes me seem pretty heartless. But hear me out, yes my view is tinged by what I believe to be protecting Israel’s self interest but it is also tinged by Liberal views. I do not see the Palestinians as the “other” which is a huge advantage I have being an American. I think negotiations will be much easier and the solutions much more seamless if both sides had the same language (and I don’t mean Hebrew or Arabic). People have to stop hating the “other” and get to know each other. There is a fundamental reason why politics don’t look entirely like they did during Machiavelli’s time—it’s because now-a-days we have the ability to see the other side and our Liberal sympathizes shine through when we see people as people—we are less inclined to kill and we are more inclined to come to fair solutions and be more satisfied with the outcomes. You have to get people together, it is the only real way forward.

It is because of these two views I just expressed that for a very long time I felt like a traitor: was I a traitor to the Jewish people for sympathizing with the Palestinians? or a traitor to my Liberal upbringing to believe in the need for a strong Jewish state? However, now I don't think there is a real contradiction. I truly believe that on one level I can support certain policies of the Israeli government because, I see the real security threat and I see the need for a Jewish Israel. But I also see how the effects of these policies hurt people and I believe I can work on the ground level to make life better for people.

Ultimately, Israelis and Palestinians, Jews, Muslims, Christians and Arabs all have to get together in order to try and at least understand where the other side is coming from. Because even if a negotiation comes about in the near future—it will never be stable until people can stop hating and stop seeing people as the “other.”